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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Julian Martin Valencia appeals from the judgment of conviction, arguing that the 
district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In the early morning on January 27, 2013, Nampa Police Officer Krohn was 
dispatched to a Nampa apartment in response to a report of a sex offense. (Conf. Exs., 
p.121.) Officer Krohn reported: 
While I was enroute dispatch advised that the victim, Sara ... had fled the 
address ... to a nearby address ... where another friend of hers lived. At 
that time all Sara could provide was the suspect's name was, Julian, and 
the suspect was her friend's boyfriend. 
When we arrived on scene we made contact with Sara. We asked her if 
we could come inside, so that she could explain what had occurred this 
date. Sara told us that she is currently residing in Payette with her 
parents, and she has a co-worker named Kayla . . . . Sara told us ... that 
Kayla had told her in the past that anytime Sara wanted to sleep over at 
her residence she was welcome to do so. 
According to Sara, approximately a week and a half prior to this date her 
and her daughter had stayed over at Kayla's house and Kayla's boyfriend 
had even been present at that time as well, but nothing had happened. 
According to Sara, on this date she dropped her daughter off at her sisters 
house, and she went over to Kayla's house to stay the night so that she 
could hang out with some friends and get to know some new people. 
According to Sara, there was another couple on scene during the evening 
time as well, and everyone in the residence was having some alcoholic 
drinks. According to Sara, at approximately 0100 hours she went to bed 
in one of Kayla's son's rooms. According to Sara, Kayla moved all of the 
children out of the front bedroom and allowed Sara to sleep in the bed. 
Sara borrowed a set of pajamas and at-shirt from Kayla to sleep in. 
According to Sara, at close to 0500 hours, she woke up to find Kayla's 
boyfriend, Julian (later identified as Julian M. Valencia,  was 
laying on top of her and he was sticking his hands down her pants and 
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according to Sara she initially stated that he "approached her" and she 
told him "no" and she told him to get off. Officer Pon asked Sara to clarify 
what she meant when she stated that Julian had approached her. Sara 
said, "He was putting his fingers inside my vagina." Sara also stated "he 
tried to flip me over." Sara stated that at that time she began saying "no, 
no, no" to Julian and told him to get off of her. Sara said that she told 
Julian to get off of her or she was going to scream. According to Sara, at 
that point Julian left the room and Sara got onto her phone and started 
texting her ex-boyfriend. According to Sara, her ex-boyfriend told her to 
get out of the house immediately and about that time Julian went to come 
back into the room. Sara also stated that while Julian was sticking his 
hands in her vagina he was telling her "I was to see you", and by that 
according to Sara, he meant he wanted to see her naked body. !11 
After Julian had left the room for the second time, Sara stated she 
grabbed as much of her things that she could find and she exited the 
room. Sara stated that the room she was in was right next to the front 
door. She stated she ran straight from the room and out the front door. 
According to Sara, Julian began following her out the door and chased her 
all the way to the door of Sara's friend's apartment. All the way Julian was 
telling Sara not to tell anyone and not to tell Kayla .... According to Sara, 
as soon as she went to her friends apartment Julian headed back towards 
his apartment. 
... I asked her if there was anything specifically that Julian had said to her 
while this was happening, and she stated that when he came back into the 
room a second time he told her that "he just wanted a taste." Sara again 
stated that she told him several times "no" and told him to get off of her 
and get out. 
(Cont. Exs., pp.121-122 (verbatim).) 
Valencia was arrested and, upon being questioned by Nampa Police Department 
Detective Palfreyman, Valencia "initially did not want to confirm that his fingers 
penetrated Sara's vagina, but he later confirmed that happened one time during the 
incident." (Conf. Exs., p.111.) Valencia admitted he "messed up," that he "was very 
1 According to Nampa Police Department Detective Palfreyman, Sara "indicated that 
[Valencia] then came back into the room moments later and penetrated her vagina 
again with his fingers." (Conv. Exs., p.109.) 
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sorry for what he did to Sara," and said "that was not the kind of person he normally is . 
. . and [he] could not explain why he did what he did." (Id.) 
The state filed a Criminal Complaint charging Valencia with battery with intent to 
commit a serious felony (rape) and felony violation of a no contact order. (R., pp.8-10.) 
Valencia was appointed counsel to represent him. (R., p.16.) Prior to the preliminary 
hearing, the grand jury charged Valencia in a Superseding Indictment with only battery 
with intent to commit a serious felony (rape), and Valencia pied not guilty to that charge. 
(R., pp.20-21, 27-28.) On May 22, 2013, the district court granted a motion by Valencia 
for substitute (retained) counsel. (R., pp.40-41.) 
On July 11, 2013, pursuant to a plea agreement, Valencia entered an Alford plea 
of guilty to the charge of battery with intent to commit a serious felony (rape). (R., 
pp.45-50; see generally 7/11/13 Tr.) In exchange, the state agreed to recommend a 
sentence of four years fixed, with the indeterminate time left open for argument, and to 
dismiss the felony violation of no contact order charges pending in case CR-2013-
5380*C, which was assigned to a different judge. (R., pp.46, 47, 50; 7/11/13 Tr., p.7, 
L.12 - p.10, L.4.) Valencia was free to argue for a lesser sentence. (R., p.46; 7/11/13 
Tr., p.7, L.19.) In his "Guilty Plea Advisory" form filed with the court, Valencia wrote (in 
relevant part), "plea agreement & no file persistent ... dismiss 3 counts felony NCO." 
(R., p.54 (capitalization modified).) The district court ordered Valencia to undergo a 
presentence interview and a psycho-sexual evaluation ("PSE"). (R., pp.49, 50, 58, 61-
65; 7/11/13 Tr., p.18, L.8-p.19, L.8.) 
On September 10, 2013, the Presentence Investigator filed a Presentence 
Report ("PSI"), stating Valencia 
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has an extensive criminal record and a history of non-compliance with 
supervIsIon. Despite numerous opportunities for rehabilitation offered 
through periods of probation, retained jurisdiction, incarceration and 
parole, he persists with serious criminal offenses and substance abuse. 
(PSI, p.20.) The PSI concluded that Valencia is a high risk to reoffend, is chemically 
dependent on cannabis and amphetamine, and "would benefit from participation in 
assessed rehabilitative programs ... and/or pro-  activities during a period of penal 
incarceration to address his/her current attitudes/orientation and behaviors." (PSI, p.21 
(emphasis added).) 
Fifteen days later, on September 25, 2013, Valencia's retained trial counsel filed 
a motion for leave to withdraw from the case, stating that "[Valencia] has requested 
counsel to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the premise of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. [Valencia] claims that counsel has failed to properly advise him 
of potential consequences thus rendering his plea involuntary and unknowing." (R., 
p.66.) On September 27, 2013, the PSE was filed with the district court, which 
concluded that Valencia is "very conning and manipulative," "possesses a high level of 
psychopathy and ... is sexually deviant," is a "HIGH risk to engage in future unlawful 
sexual behavior ... [and] [h)e can also be considered a HIGH risk to engage in future 
criminal behaviors, not necessarily sexual in nature." (PSE, pp.1-2 (capitalization 
original).) 
On October 21, 2013, at a hearing on Valencia's counsel's motion to withdraw 
from the case, the court explained that Valencia had filed an ex parte motion expressing 
his unhappiness about his retained counsel's representation of him, and threatening to 
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report counsel to the Idaho State Bar.2 (10/21/13 Tr., p.5, L.25 - p.6, L.8.) Given the 
"conflicting situation," the district court granted counsel's motion to withdraw and re-
appointed the public defender's office to represent Valencia. (R. pp.70-71; 10/21/13 Tr., 
p.8, L.15 - p.9, L.24.) The court reset the sentencing hearing to December 30, 2013, 
and advised Valencia the continuance would allow him time to contact newly appointed 
counsel and file whatever motions he felt appropriate. (10/21/13 Tr., p.9, Ls.12-17.) 
When Valencia said he had previously told his retained counsel that he wanted to 
withdraw his plea, the court advised him to talk to his new attorney and "tell him what 
you want done so he can do it." (Tr., p.9, L.18- p.10, L.25.) 
On December 13, 2013, Valencia, through re-appointed counsel, filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. (R., pp.73-76.) The basis for Valencia's motion was as follows: 
The Defendant felt pressured to accept the offered resolution and has 
since determined that a jury trial would be a more appropriate resolution of 
this case. After further reflection the Defendant has determined that the 
Defendant should not enter a guilty plea to conduct at hand and the 
Defendant does not feel the Defendant committed the crime as alleged. 
(R., p.75.) At the December 30, 2013 hearing on Valencia's motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea, his counsel explained: 
2 That ex parte motion, dated September 21, 2013, states in relevant part, "I was 
threatened with the 'persistent violator' statue [sic), to which I am not eligible for. I have 
only been convicted with 'one' felony in my life, as an adult." (Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea, p.1, 12/4/14 Aug. Order.) The motion bears a stamp by a district court 
"secretary," dated 10/3/13, which states, "Pursuant to Administrative Order #98-1, this 
correspondence was opened by court personnel and has not been read or reviewed by 
the judge." (Id., p.2.) 
The district court also apparently received a letter from Valencia, dated 
September 29, 2013, and file-stamped October 2, 2013, in which he complains about 
trial counsel's performance, including counsel's failure to "revoc. [Valencia's] plea and 
numerous complications." (Letter, p.1, 12/4/14 Aug. Order.) 
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. . . [M]y client was previously represented by counsel. I believe that in 
that motion that he had withdrawn, that the Court has learned there was 
some displeasure in how he represented my client. Part of that being, 
Judge, is that some representations made to my client regarding the 
persistent violator statute. 
And one of the errors that I noticed is when I was previously 
representing Julian is that one of the pretrial -- the little green sheet, it 
mentions a previous felony out of Wisconsin. And he indicated to me that 
that was not a felony. Also, in looking at the presentence investigation 
completed in this matter, they do not recognize that, also. So there is only 
the one prior felony, which we do recognize. 
Part of what was resolved in this case is that my client entered a 
plea under the understanding that the State would not be pursuing a 
persistent violator. That being said, Judge, I know that part of the 
representations that were made to Julian involved both cases at hand, 
both the NCOs as well as the battery charge. 
First off, my client had not been found guilty of any of those 
charges. Part of the representation was made was that hey, if you're 
found guilty of this NCO, they can use that against you. Looking at some 
case law on point, specifically State v. Harrington, regarding when multiple 
charges are charged and end up sentenced around the same date, they 
are not considered separate convictions but instead one conviction for the 
persistent violator statute. 
(12/30/13 Tr., p.13, L.11 - p.14, L.19.) The district court noted that it appeared "there 
was never any threat by the State to file the persistent violator because that was not 
part of the plea agreement[,]" and the prosecutor agreed, stating "[i]t was not part of the 
plea agreement." (12/30/2013 Tr., p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.2.) Valencia's trial counsel 
argued that, even though "the persistent violator was not put on the record as far as part 
of the deal in this case[,]" "there was, in both [prosecutors'] e-mails, responses to us!3l 
3 By "us," it is apparent that the re-appointed public defender was referring to another 
public defender ("Mr. Ferney") who had also previously (i.e., during the initial 
appointment) engaged in discussions with prosecutors handling Valencia's case. (See 
12/30/13 Tr., p.20, Ls.3-13.) 
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and part of the resolution included the persistent violator and not pursuing a persistent 
violator." (12/30/13 Tr., p.19, L.25 - p.20, L.13.) 
After the parties presented arguments, the district court denied Valencia's motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea, ruling: 
The Court ... does note that prior counsel withdrew on September 
25th of this year. The presentence investigation report was filed with the 
Court on September 1 ot\ 2013. Defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty 
plea was not filed until after the public defender had the case again after 
that, but certainly the presentence investigation report and the 
psychosexual evaluation were available for review prior to those times. 
The motion to withdraw the guilty plea was only filed after a very negative 
psychosexual evaluation was performed and a presentence investigation 
report that recommended prison. 
At the time defendant entered his guilty plea, he was aware the 
State would be recommending four fixed followed by an undetermined 
amount of tail on that sentence. He reserved the right to argue for a 
lesser offense at the time he entered that plea. 
This Court does believe that there is prejudice to the State, 
specifically prejudice to the victim in this case thinking this matter had 
reached a resolution and the sentence was going forward. 
And if the Court were to allow withdrawal of the plea, given the 
length of time that his has been pending, the fact that the public defender 
previously represented the defendant with regard to these charges, the 
Court in its discretion is going to deny defendant's motion to withdraw the 
guilty plea. 
(12/30/13 Tr., p.21, L.2 - p.22, L.9.) 
At a consolidated sentencing hearing, pursuant to the plea agreement, the district 
court dismissed all three counts of felony violation of a no contact order in case CR-
2013-5380. (R., pp.54, 82; 1/10/13 Tr., p.24, Ls.5-8; p.34, Ls.15-17; see Idaho Data 
Repository, Canyon County, Case No. CR-2013-5380-C.) The court sentenced 
Valencia to a unified ten years with four years fixed for his conviction for battery with 
intent to commit a serious felony (rape). (R., pp.94-95.) Valencia filed a Rule 35 motion 
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to reconsider sentence (R., pp.86-93), which was denied (R., pp.110-113). Valencia 
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.100-103.) 
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ISSUE 
Valencia states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Valencia's motion to withdraw his guilty plea? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Valencia failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the district court's 
denial of his pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea? 
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ARGUMENT 
Valencia Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion In 
Denying His Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
A Introduction 
Valencia's written motion to withdraw his guilty plea asserted he "felt pressured to 
accept the offered resolution and has since determined that a jury trial would be a more 
appropriate resolution of this case," and he did "not feel [he] committed the crime as 
alleged." (R., p.75.) At the hearing on that motion, Valencia's counsel verbally argues 
that prior counsel had been ineffective in advising Valencia about the possibility of the 
state bringing a persistent violator enhancement. (12/30/13 Tr., p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.2.) 
Counsel accurately acknowledged Valencia faced multiple counts of felony violation of a 
no contact order in a separate case. (12/30/13 Tr., p.14, Ls.6-14; p.20, Ls.3-9.) 
Valencia's counsel then argued, "Looking at some case law on point, specifically State 
v. Harrington, regarding when multiple charges are charged and end up sentenced 
around the same date, they are not considered separate convictions but instead one 
conviction for the persistent violator statute." (12/30/13 Tr., p.14, Ls.14-19.) The district 
court denied Valencia's motion to withdraw his plea, although it did not explicitly 
address the verbal argument made by Valencia's trial counsel.4 
On appeal, Valencia correctly notes that, under State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 
563, 990 P.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1999), "[c]harges in the same information 'count as a single 
conviction for purposes of establishing habitual offender status."' (Appellant's Brief, 
4 In denying Valencia's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the district court focused on 
its determination that "[t]he motion to withdraw the guilty plea was only filed after a very 
negative psychosexual evaluation was performed and a presentence investigation 
report that recommended prison." (12/30/13 Tr., p.21, Ls.13-16.) 
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pp.10-11 (quoting Harrington, 133 Idaho at 565,990 P.2d at 146.) However, Valencia's 
argument relies on the mistaken factual assertion that he was charged with multiple 
felonies in this case, and ignores the fact that prior to his guilty plea in this case, he 
faced three counts of felony violation of a no contact order in another case. Valencia's 
argument fails because any representation by his trial counsel that the state could 
potentially file a persistent violator charge was correct, and the plea agreement5 gave 
Valencia the assurance that he would not be subjected to such a charge. 6 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to 
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from 
arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 775, 780-781 
(2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941 P.2d 330, 334 (Ct. App. 
1997)). A district court's factual findings are generally reviewed for clear error. !;&., 
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998); State v. Bush, 
131 Idaho 22, 28, 951 P.2d 1249, 1255 (1997). An appellate court will defer to the trial 
court's factual findings if they are supported by substantial competent evidence. !;&_, 
5 The state assumes, arguendo, that Valencia believed the plea agreement included a 
promise by the prosecutor to not file a persistent violator charge. (See R., p.54 (Guilty 
Plea Advisory form stating "plea agreement & no file persistent ... dismiss 3 counts 
felony NCO").) 
6 Although the court did not make a specific finding that Valencia failed to present a just 
reason for withdrawing his guilty plea, such a finding is implicit in the denial of 
Valencia's motion to withdraw his plea. See State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625, 726 
P.2d 735, 737 (1986) (implicit findings of trial court should be overturned only if 
unsupported by evidence); State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (Ct. 
App. 1998) ("[A]ny implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence 
should be given due deference."). 
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State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 
254, 869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994). 
C. Valencia Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In The Denial Of His 
Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by I.C.R. 33(c), which provides: 
(c) Withdrawal of plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may 
be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is 
suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may 
set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw 
defendant's plea. 
Although a district court's discretion should be "liberally exercised" when ruling 
on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea made prior to the pronouncement of sentence, 
withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an automatic right. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 
P.3d at 780. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990). Rather, 
"the defendant has the burden of showing a 'just reason' exists to withdraw the plea." 
Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780 (citations omitted). Failure to present 
and support a just or plausible reason, even absent prejudice to the prosecution, will 
weigh against granting withdrawal. State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579, 
583 (Ct. App. 2004). "[T]he good faith, credibility, and weight of the defendant's 
assertions in support of his motion to withdraw his plea are matters for the trial court to 
decide." Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 537, 211 P.3d at 782 (citations omitted). Valencia 
failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea. 
First, although Valencia's trial counsel correctly acknowledged the fact that 
Valencia faced multiple charges of felony violation of a no contact order in a separate 
case, counsel's legal argument that, under Harrington, "when multiple charges are 
12 
charged and end up sentenced around the same date, they are not considered separate 
convictions but instead one conviction for the persistent violator statute" (12/30/13 Tr., 
p.14, Ls.14-19) is misplaced. Trial counsel's statement that multiple charges 
"sentenced around the same date" count only as "one conviction for the persistent 
violator statue" (id.) has no support in law, nor has any been presented on appeal. The 
accurate statement of law is that charges in the same information "count as a single 
conviction for purposes of establishing habitual offender status." State v. Harrington, 
133 Idaho 563, 565, 990 P.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1999). Valencia's argument at the hearing 
on his motion to withdraw his plea was simply based on an incorrect legal premise, and 
the district court properly denied the motion. 
In his argument on appeal, Valencia recites the correct legal principle that 
convictions entered the same day or charged in the same information should count as a 
single conviction for purposes of establishing habitual offender status under I.C. § 19-
2514. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.10-11); State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341,344, 715 P.2d 
1011, 1014 (Ct. App.1988). However, Valencia relies upon an errant view of the facts. 
Valencia bases his entire argument on the premise that he was charged in the 
Superseding Indictment in this case with two felony charges -- battery with intent to 
commit a serious felony (rape) and violation of a no contact order. Further, Valencia 
ignores the fact that, contemporaneous with this case, he was charged with three 
counts of felony violation of a no contact order in another case. His explanation of the 
underlying principal of his claim bears repeating: 
Mr. Valencia believed that he could be subject to the persistent violator 
statute if he did not plead guilty because his original counsel ... led him to 
believe that the two charges he was facing would amount to his second 
and third felonies for the purpose of the persistent violator statute. This 
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was not supported by the law. Charges in the same information "count as 
a single conviction for purposes of establishing habitual offender status." 
State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 565 (Ct. App. 1999). Thus, Mr. 
Valencia was not at risk of being subject to the persistent violator statute 
as he believed. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.10-11 (quoting Harrington, 133 Idaho at 565, 990 P.2d at 146); 
emphasis added.) 
Valencia's argument is based on a factual error. In this case (Canyon County 
Case No. CR-2013-287 4-C), the second charge of the Criminal Complaint -- felony 
violation of a no contact order (see R., pp.8-10) -- was not included in the Superseding 
Indictment. (R., pp.20-21; see R., pp.27-28, 45-50.) At the same time Valencia's 
battery with intent to commit a serious felony (rape) charge in this case was pending, he 
faced three felony counts of violating a no contact order in a separate case, with a 
different judge -- Canyon County Case No. CR-2013-5380-C - the very charges the 
prosecutor agreed to dismiss as part of an overall plea agreement covering both cases. 
(R., pp.54, 82; 1/10/13 Tr., p.24, Ls.5-8; p.34, Ls.15-17; see Idaho Data Repository, 
Canyon County, Case No. CR-2013-5380-C.) 
There is no dispute that Valencia's first felony conviction occurred in 2005, when 
he was convicted of felony possession of a controlled substance. (See PSI, pp.9, 13.) 
If Valencia had been convicted of any one of the three felony offenses pending in case 
CR-2013-5380-C prior to trial in this case, he could have been charged as a persistent 
violator in this case. Likewise, a conviction at trial in this case would have made 
Valencia eligible for the persistent violator enhancement charge in the other pending 
case. Thus, the record establishes that by resolving both pending felony cases in a 
single plea agreement Valencia avoided a persistent violator charge. 
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In sum, Valencia's trial counsel's advice that Valencia could avoid a persistent 
violator charge by accepting the plea offer was accurate. Once the three felony charges 
in the other case were dismissed, Valencia received the full benefit of his plea 
agreement by insuring he would not be charged in either case as a persistent violator.7 
Valencia failed to meet his burden of showing any just reason to withdraw his guilty 
plea, and that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion. The 
judgment of the district court should therefore be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's denial of 
Valencia's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
DATED this 29th day of December, 2014. 
JO I C. McKINNEY ( 
De uty Attorney Gene 
7 In regard to "prejudice" to the prosecution, the state relies in full on the district court's 
following comments, delivered at the end of the hearing on Valencia's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea: 
This Court does believe that there is prejudice to the State, 
specifically prejudice to the victim in this case thinking this matter had 
reached a resolution and the sentence was going forward. 
And if the Court were to allow withdrawal of the plea, given the 
length of time that this has been pending ... , the Court in its discretion is 
going to deny defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
(12/30/13 Tr., p.21, L.23 - p.22, L.9.) 
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